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U.S. Unilateralism in Trade: Restructuring the Global Order and Korea¡¯s Strategy

Cracks in the Global Trade Order
Until the early 21st century, the global trade system was fundamentally based on multilateralism. The WTO served as a mediator in dispute resolution, and the United States acted as both the guardian and architect of that order. However, since 2016, the U.S. trade policy has undergone a dramatic shift, with the emergence of a unilateralist strategy under the banner of "America First." This was not a temporary political slogan, but a structural transformation that shook the foundations of the global economic landscape.

The U.S. no longer pursues market openness based on rules and cooperation. Instead, it has reverted to a trade strategy focused on strategic national interests, reinforcing links between security and economics. At the core of this shift lie nationalized supply chain restructuring, protection of strategic industries, and export controls justified by national security. These changes undermine the foundation of the free trade system, and the pressure exerted even on allies is constructing a new trade paradigm. Under this paradigm, trade functions not as a tool for shared prosperity, but as an instrument of competition and exclusion.

U.S.-China Trade War and Supply Chain Restructuring
The U.S.'s unilateral trade policy came into full view with the U.S.-China trade war. The tariffs imposed on China beginning in 2018 went beyond addressing trade imbalances—they became strategic tools to curb China's technological rise and industrial ambitions. The U.S. viewed China's "Made in China 2025" initiative as a threat and responded by tightening export controls in strategic sectors such as semiconductors, AI, and batteries. These measures transformed from short-term sanctions to sustained structural pressure, marking the opening phase of a comprehensive economic conflict between the two powers.

Consequently, global supply chains began to be restructured with a focus on security over efficiency. The U.S. has sought to establish "friendly-shoring" or "value-aligned supply chains" with its allies. This is not merely industrial cooperation—it functions as a geopolitical alignment mechanism. Decoupling or derisking from China is being promoted within this framework, placing structural pressure on advanced technology countries such as Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The U.S. has leveraged export controls on semiconductor equipment and imposed technology cooperation conditions even on its allies, turning trade policy into an extension of foreign policy.

Tariff Policies and Tensions with Allies
Under the banner of protecting domestic industries, the U.S. has implemented sweeping tariff policies. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum were justified on national security grounds and applied even to allies like South Korea. The U.S. has simultaneously pressured countries like the EU, Japan, and Korea to open their markets and adhere to export restrictions on specific items, emphasizing strategic compliance over mutual trust. Economic policy under the guise of national security has been used to push protectionist objectives, even at the expense of clashing with WTO norms.

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS Act, though framed as industrial promotion laws, effectively seek to restructure the dependence of allies' supply chains. These laws condition subsidies on the establishment of production facilities in the U.S., forcing strategic decisions upon foreign companies. While such measures are presented as cooperative tools, they functionally restrict economic sovereignty and weaken global cooperation.

Weakening of the WTO and the Decline of Rules-Based Order
The U.S. has effectively withdrawn its trust in the WTO system. Its continued refusal to approve new appointments to the WTO Appellate Body has paralyzed the organization's dispute resolution function. This reflects a U.S. unwillingness to accept external interference in its industrial policy, export controls, and subsidy practices. As a result, the WTO has been reduced from the centerpiece of global trade to a nominal framework.

Countries have shifted back to bilateral and quasi-multilateral agreements, reducing the predictability of trade rules and increasing the potential for politically driven conflicts. Developing nations are particularly vulnerable, as the structure of global trade becomes more rigid and less equitable. Meanwhile, discussions on WTO reform have seen little progress due to U.S. disengagement. The void left by multilateralism is fostering a new trade order shaped by power competition among major economies.

Failures of U.S. Unilateralism and Lessons Learned
U.S. unilateralism has not been successful in all respects. The high tariffs on Chinese goods temporarily revived some manufacturing employment in the U.S., but also led to rising consumer prices and disruptions in corporate supply chains. With the added strain of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, these policies contributed to domestic inflationary pressures.

Deteriorating relationships with allies have also hindered the formation of stable coalitions in the tech rivalry with China. The EU, South Korea, and Japan have responded to U.S. demands based on their own industrial interests, revealing the limits of unilateral pressure. Ultimately, U.S. unilateralism has demonstrated that lasting influence comes not from coercion, but from designing norms and securing technological leadership through cooperation.

Political Foundations of U.S. Protectionism
U.S. unilateral trade policy is deeply rooted in domestic politics. Job insecurity in the Midwest manufacturing belt, anxiety over China's industrial rise, and income inequality caused by globalization have all fueled voter support for protectionism. Both Democrats and Republicans agree on the core goals of protecting strategic industries and countering China, suggesting that unilateralism will persist regardless of which party is in power.

The political landscape post-2024 appears likely to reinforce this trend. The U.S.-China rivalry is no longer a simple trade conflict—it encompasses technology, security, and ideological competition. The U.S. is weaponizing trade as a diplomatic tool, forcing choices even upon its allies.

This approach began under the Trump administration, continued under the Biden administration, and is now being further intensified under a renewed Trump administration, making significant changes unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Korea¡¯s Response: The Need for Compressed Balancing
Korea is strategically positioned between the U.S. and China. Its key industries—semiconductors, batteries, displays, and electric vehicles—depend heavily on both markets, placing it at the epicenter of supply chain restructuring. In this context, Korea must adopt a strategy of compressed balancing rather than simple diplomatic neutrality.

Compressed balancing requires a tightly integrated response across foreign policy, industrial policy, and technological strategy. In semiconductors, for instance, Korea must participate in the CHIPS Act to access IRA benefits while also maintaining or diversifying its manufacturing presence in China. With the WTO weakened, Korea should assert leadership in regional agreements like CPTPP and IPEF to shape emerging trade norms.

Domestically, strategic autonomy must be bolstered through tax incentives for R\&D, localization of key materials and components, and a robust talent development pipeline. In a trade environment where openness is no longer the dominant logic, Korea must adopt a survival strategy grounded in self-determination. Beyond short-term responses, Korea must also strengthen its negotiating power in emerging areas like digital trade, AI governance, and green trade.

In a Vacuum of Order, Policy Design Is Critical
The global trade order is in a state of transition. The U.S. has shifted from being a guardian of norms to a pursuer of strategic self-interest, and the WTO has lost its coordinating role. In its place, new rules centered on strategic trade, security-based supply chains, and value-based alliances are taking shape. Korea must evolve from a rule-taker to a rule-maker in this new landscape.

What is needed now is not just reaction, but the capacity to design policy. Trade is no longer solely an economic issue—it is a strategic frontier that encompasses diplomacy, security, and technology. As new trade grammar is being written, Korea must be equipped with strategic agility and resilience. That preparation begins with a sober recognition of the realities of unilateralism.



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